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RIGHT TO MAILING LISTS
courts will follow the precedent of Clothing Workers, i.e., the ap-
plication of liberal agency principles. Such results would appear de-
sirable since outside community pressure seems a major obstacle
to the attainment of basic section 7 rights, 43 one that merely setting
aside the representation election cannot fully remedy.44
TommY W. JARRETT
Labor Law-Representation Elections-Union Right to Employee
Mailing Lists
In February, 1966, the National Labor Relations Board ex-
pounded a new rule governing future cases involving representation
elections. The rule provides that after an election has been agreed
to by the parties or directed by the regional director, the employer
is required to "file with the Regional Director an election eligibility
list, containing the names and addresses of all the eligible voters.
The Regional Director, in turn, shall make this information avail-
category because section 7 rights are guaranteed to employees, not to
citizens generally and because the right not to join a union, as guaranteed
in section 7, is not wholly dependent upon an act of Congress because this
right is only the embodiment of employees' pre-existing rights. Id. at 628.
The court also stated that the NLRB and not the courts is to determine
what constitutes an unfair labor practice. Furthermore, the court reasoned
that since the Taft-Hartley Act only covers acts by employers, unions, or
their agents, the states, and not the federal government, must punish others
who might conspire to violate the rights of workers. Id. at 631. See also
United States v. Moore, 129 Fed. 630 (N.D.Ala. Cir. 1904), where the
court held that section 241 was not available to protect a miner in his right
to organize because this right existed because of his status as an employee,
not because of his being a citizen. Cf. UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th
Cir. 1954) (court denied recovery of punitive damages).
"' Section 7 is the basic provision of labor law. It reads in part: Em-
ployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, to join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities .... National Labor Relations Act § 7, 41 Stat. 452 (1935), as
amended, Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61
Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1965).
"Once the requisite laboratory conditions have been upset, it seems that
they, to a large degree, remain so during the second election. It was found
that after the election was "tainted," the party losing has about a one-in-
three chance of winning the second. Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections, 41
N.C.L. REv. 209 (1963). Also, it seems that antiunion elements, particularly
in the South, have a ready made issue to use against unions in the form of
race hate. See Pollitt, The National Labor Relations Board and Race Hate
Propaganda in Union Organizational Drives, 17 STAN. L. R.v. 373 (1965).
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able to all parties in the case."1 Noncompliance with this rule is
grounds for setting the election aside.- The basis for this rule seems
to be the imbalance in opportunity for each side in the election pro-
ceeding to reach the electorate with its arguments, an imbalance
felt by the NLRB to exist when employee mailing lists are not made
available to the labor organization involved.' The NLRB said,
[W]e regard it as the Board's function to conduct elections in
which employees have the opportunity to cast their ballots for or
against representation under circumstances that are free not only
from interference, restraint, or coercion violative of the Act, but
also from other elements that prevent or impede a free and rea-
soned choice. Among the factors that undoubtedly tend to im-
pede such a choice is a lack of information with respect to one
of the choices available.4
In support of its ruling the NLRB maintained that "by providing
all parties with employees' names and addresses, we maximize the
likelihood that all the voters will be exposed to the arguments for,
as well as against, union representation."- Additional reasons given
were that mailing lists are usually not available from other sources,'
and that the rule set forth here is commonly found in other election
settings.7 The Board rejected the employer's arguments that a valid
'Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (Feb. 4, 1966).
'Id. at -. The rule as announced was to be applied prospectively only,
to elections directed or consented to thirty days from the date of decision,
this "to insure that all parties to forthcoming representation elections are
fully aware of their rights and obligations as here stated." Id. at n.5.
In ruling as it did the NLRB was apparently well within its authority.
"Congress has entrusted the Board with a wide degree of discretion in
establishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and
free choice of bargaining representatives by employees." NLRB v. A. J.
Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946). See, e.g., NLRB v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940).
'As a practical matter, an employer, through his possession of em-
ployee names and home addresses as well as his ability to communi-
cate with employees on plant premises, is assured of the continuing
opportunity to inform the entire electorate of his views with respect to
union representation. On the other hand, without a list of employee
names and addresses, a labor organization, whose organizers normally
have no right of access to plant premises, has no method by which it
can be certain of reaching all the employees with its arguments in
favor of representation, and, as a result, employees are often com-
pletely unaware of that point of view.




Id. at -. Examples cited were public, shareholder, and intraunion elec-
tions.
[Vol. 45
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property interest exists in such a mailing list,' that the employees'
rights are infringed by the giving out of such a list without their
consent,' that the Board's rule creates a danger of harassment and
coercion of the employees in their homes,1" and that other avenues
of union communication with the employees are available.11 In both
its rule and its reasoning, the NLRB had the prior support of many
commentators.12
Another reason given by the NLRB in behalf of its new rule was that
there is a public interest in the speedy resolution of questions of representa-
tion. The NLRB maintained that with
little time (and no home addresses) with which to satisfy itself as
to the eligibility of the 'unknowns', the union is forced either to
challenge all those who appear at the polls whom it does not know
or risk having ineligible employees vote. The effect of putting the
union to this choice, we have found, is to increase the number of
challenges . . . thus requiring investigation and resolution by the
Regional Director or the Board. Prompt disclosure of employee names
as well as addresses will, we are convinced, eliminate the necessity
for challenges based solely on lack of knowledge as to the voter's
identity.
Id. at -.
'The NLRB found that there was not an employer interest here of
such significance as to warrant protection. Id. at -.
'The NLRB found no merit in this argument, pointing out that the
employees could express their wishes by their vote in the election. Id. at -.
" The NLRB maintained that such union conduct cannot be assumed,
but that if it happened, the Board would provide an appropriate remedy.
Id. at--.
" Rejecting this argument the NLRB maintained that "the existence
of alternative channels of communication is relevant only when the oppor-
tunity to communicate made available by the NLRB would interfere with
a significant employer interest." Since there is no significant employer
interest in the secrecy of the names and addresses of his employees, there is
no need for the NLRB to consider the existence of alternative channels of
communication. Id. at -.
" See, e.g., SuBcomm. ON NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, HousE
CoMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 87THK CONG., IST Sis., ADmxisTRA-
TION OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr BY TnE NLRB 4 (Comm.
Print 1961); Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38,
99-100 (1964); Pollitt, The National Labor Relations Board and Race Hate
Propaganda in Union Organization Drives, 17 STAN. L. Rv. 373, 407
(1965); Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1263-64 (1963). See also, Summers,
Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 YALE L.J. 1221, 1227-28 (1961).
In attempting to enforce its Excelsior rule by means of a subpoena
ordering production of the employee mailing list, the NLRB has two
successes in federal district courts. NLRB v. Rohlen, 64 L.R.R.M. 2168
(N.D. Ill. 1967), and NLRB v. Wolverine Indus. Div., 64 L.R.R.M. 2060
(E.D. Mich. 1966). In enforcing the NLRB's subpoena, both decisions
found the merits of the cases involved to be in accord with the finding in
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As a general proposition, in representation cases the NLRB
strives to cure any imbalance which tends to prevent the voters from
being fairly informed of the issues involved in the election."3 Where
employees are denied a free and fair election choice, the results may
be set aside even though there has been no commission of an unfair
labor practice.' 4 A brief examination of some earlier cases may
aid in explaining how the Board reached the Excelsior decision.
One group of cases demonstrates that the Board has long bal-
anced the employer's right to free speech against the employees'
right to have a free choice in selecting their bargaining representa-
tive. At times the result was a finding that an employer's speech
amounted to an unfair labor practice, 5 especially if the Board felt
that the employees had been restrained or coerced in the exercise of
their rights to organize and to engage in collective bargaining.' 6
In 1947, Section 8(c),1 the so-called "free speech proviso," was
added to the National Labor Relations Act. It limited the NLRB
in its finding of an unfair labor practice in this situation to cases in
Excelsior. No express jurisdictional issue was discussed in Wolverine. In
Rohlen jurisdiction was based expressly on 61 Stat. 150 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 161(2) (1964) (§ 11(2) of the N.L.R.A.), which gives United States
district courts jurisdiction to issue orders enforcing Board subpoenas "to
produce evidence" or "to give testimony touching the matter under in-
vestigation," and 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964), which gives the district courts
jurisdiction over "any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of
Congress regulating commerce." In two other similar cases, the NLRB
was unsuccessful. NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., 63 L.R.R.M. 2513
(M.D.N.C. 1966), and NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 64 L.R.R.M.
2061 (M.D. Fla. 1966). Neither decision ruled on the merits of Excelsior,
both decisions declining jurisdiction to enforce the NLRB's subpoena. In
Hanes jurisdiction was expressly denied under 61 Stat. 150 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 161(2) (1964) on the ground that an employee mailing list had no
relation to "evidence" or "testimony touching the matter under investiga-
tion." The court also declined, in its discretion, to take jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964). Jurisdiction in Montgontery Ward was denied
on the same ground as in Hanes.
3 In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under con-
ditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires
of the employees. It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is
also our duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled. When,
in the rare extreme case, the standard drops too low, because of our
fault or that of others, the requisite laboratory conditions are not
present and the experiment must be conducted over again.
General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
14Id. at 126.
' NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).16But see NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
',61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 15 8(c) (1964).
[Vol. 45
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which the employer's speech amounted to a "threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit."'" However, many other cases decided
subsequent to the passage of 8(c) have held that even though the
employer's speech was not an unfair labor practice, it might never-
theless upset the requisite "laboratory conditions" surrounding an
election to such an extent that a new election was necessary.' 9
In another group of cases the NLRB has employed a balancing
process in deciding the validity of company rules prohibiting union
solicitation or the distribution of union literature on company prop-
erty. In the solicitation situation the Board must balance the right
of employees to organize against the right of the employer to main-
tain discipline in his establishment.2 ° The Board has said that a
rule which prohibits solicitation by an employee on company property
outside of working hours "must be presumed to be an unreasonable
impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatory in the
absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule neces-
sary in order to maintain production or discipline."'" Distribution
of union literature is distinguished from solicitation, since distribu-
tion could result in littering work areas and impinging on the em-
ployer's right to engage in production. Therefore, the employer
can limit distribution to non-work areas of his establishment, but a
rule prohibiting employees from distributing literature anywhere
on the employer's premises is invalid on its face.22 Another dis-
tinction that is made in this area is that between organizing activities
by employee and non-employee. An example is found in NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co.,28 in which the nondiscriminatory refusal of
the employer to permit distribution of union literature by non-em-
ployee union organizers on company-owned parking lots was held
not to have unreasonably impeded the employees' right to self-or-
ganization because the locations of the plants and of the living quar-
" Section 8(c) by its terms is limited to situations involving unfair labor
practices and not those in which representation elections can be set aside
because of the employer's speech.
" See, e.g., Lord Baltimore Press, 142 N.L.R.B. 328 (1963) (election
set aside where employer's promise to litigate was coupled with statements
which pointed out that union might cause a strike and pursue other policies
detrimental to the employees); Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962)
(inflammatory mass of race hate literature by the employer to defeat union
organizational attempts).
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945).
Peyton Packing Co., Inc., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943).
2' Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
22 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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ters of the employees did not place the employees beyond the reach
of reasonable efforts of the unions to communicate with them by
other means. However, where there are no other avenues of ap-
proach open to the union in its organization attempts, it is an unfair
labor practice for the employer to deny the union access to its
premises.24
Earlier cases having a more direct bearing on Excelsior are those
in which the labor organization has sought an opportunity to reply
to antiunion speeches made by the employer, a situation analogous
to the union's demand for a mailing list in Excelsior. In Bonwit
Teller, Inc., 5 the employer had a no-solicitation rule which forbade
solicitation during working and non-working time on the selling
floors of a department store.26 Pre-election antiunion speeches were
made to employees in the selling areas but the employer refused
the union's request for an opportunity to reply on equal terms. The
Board's order required the employer to cease and desist from making
such antiunion speeches unless, upon request, a like opportunity was
accorded to the labor organization against which the speeches were
directed. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
limited the Board's order to the extent that if the employer aban-
doned his broad no-solicitation rule, he would be free to make
antiunion speeches without having to accord the union equal time.2
The NLRB nevertheless continued to apply its "equal opportunity"
principle in several later cases28 until, in Livingston Shirt Corp.,'
that principle was rejected by a majority of the Board."° In Liv-
ingston the employer, who had a no-solicitation rule in effect, made
" See NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949), where the
NLRB was upheld in finding an unfair labor practice where the employer
discriminated against the labor organization by denying it the use of a
company-owned meeting hall which was the only available meeting hall in
a company town.
2596 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
"' Such a broad rule was privileged in the case of retail department
stores. Famous-Barr Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 981 (1944).
"" Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1952).
"Stow Mfg. Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1953); Onondaga Pottery Co.,
103 N.L.R.B. 770 (1953); Seamprufe, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 298 (1953);
Metropolitan Auto parts, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1953).20 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
[T]hat [Bonwit Teller] view rested on the belief that the em-
ployer exerted undue and unlawful influence upon the employees
by monopolizing their workplace as a speechmaking platform. NLRB
appraisal of the basic elements underlying this type of situation
[Vol. 45
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noncoercive antiunion speeches to the employees, but refused to
allow equal time to the union. The Board ruled that
[I]n the absence of either an unlawful broad no-solicitation rule
(prohibiting union access to company premises on other than
working time) or a privileged no-solicitation rule (broad, but not
lawful because of the character of the business), an employer does
not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a pre-election
speech on company time and premises to his employees and denies
the union's request for an opportunity to reply. 1
This viewpoint was seemingly approved by the Supreme Court
in NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Americas2 [Nutone, Inc.],
where the employer used methods of persuasion forbidden to
the employees by a no-solicitation rule. The Court said that if
"the opportunities for effectively reaching the employees with
a pro-union message, in spite of a no-solicitation rule, are at
least as great as the employer's ability to promote the legally
authorized expression of his antiunion views, there is no basis
for invalidating these 'otherwise valid' rules."'33  However, in
that case there was no request made by the union for equal time
so it may be maintained with certainty that the Supreme Court
was approving the Board's denial of equal time to the union.
Finally, in The May Co.,"4 the NLRB reaffirmed its "equal op-
portunity" rule in regard to retail department stores.3 , There,
the Board recognized that the employer, because of the character
of its business, was privileged to adopt a no-solicitation rule
covering both working and nonworking time even though such
a rule significantly restricted the employees' self-organization rights
by foreclosing discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
organization among employees at their place of work. The Board
persuades us that the Act does not require the employer, absent
unusual circumstances, to accede to such a union request.
Id. at 405.
311 Id. at 409.
"357 U.S. 357 (1958).
"Id. at 364.
136 N.L.R.B. 797, enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
""[T]he Board and court holding in the Bonzit Teller case, which
we consider to be legally sound, squarely controls the issue in the present
case." Id. at 799. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
and denied enforcement of the NLRB's order, May Dep't Stores Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963), but the NLRB has continued to
affirm its holding in May. See Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B.
846, 848 n.4 (1964).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
found that when the employer used the company premises and
company time to make an antiunion speech to the employees, he
"created a glaring imbalance in organizational communication." The
Board then ruled that the employer could give such speeches but that
he was under an obligation, in order to allow a proper balance to -
be maintained, to accede to the union's request to address the em-
ployees under similar circumstances 8
After May, the status of the law was that the NLRB was im-
posing an "equal time" rule on an employer only in retail department
store cases and then only when the employer had in effect a broad,
but privileged, no-solicitation rule. In other cases a union request
for equal opportunity to address the employees has been refused
where other avenues of approach have been open.3 7 Excelsior
seems to make an inroad on this practice since awarding the union
a mailing list goes far toward putting it on a par with the employer.
In General Elec. Corp.,"8 decided the same day as Excelsior,
the Board was asked to apply its department store rule of "equal
time" to the industry in general. It refused, primarily because of its
Excelsior ruling, saying that
[I]n light of the increased opportunities for employees' access
to communications which should flow from Excelsior, but with
which we have, as yet, no experience, ... we prefer to defer any
reconsideration of current Board doctrine in the area of plant
access until after the effects of Excelsior become known.3 9
After more than a year of NLRB administrative experience
with the Excelsior rule, it appears safe to assume the rule has re-
sulted in sufficient union accessability so that a stiffer rule is not
needed at this time. 0
GEORGE L. LiTTLE, JR.
Taxation-Interest Deductions-Sham and Business Purpose Tests
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides, "There shall be
allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable
136 N.L.R.B. at 802.
'TNLRB v. United Steelworkers of America [Nutone, Inc.], 357 U.S.
357 (1958).'. 156 NLRB No. 112 (Feb. 4, 1966).
I8fd. at -.
40 See note 11 supra for cases in which the Board has sought to enforce
its Excelsior rule in federal district court.
[Vol. 45
